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STATE112IJT OF SEHATOR MIKE MAHSFIELD (D . , f.10IlTANA)

NUClEAR TEST BAU TREATY
Mr. President:
For several Heeks, the Senate has had the proposed Treaty on
Nuclear Testing.

The question has been examined intensively not only by

the Committee on Foreign Relations but also by members of the Armed Services
Committee and the Senate members of the Committee on Atomic Energy, all of
,.,hom l·rere invited to participate in the hearings .
There has been in process, in short, a very thorough Senate consideration of the proposed Treaty.

The specific questions have already

been asked and ansHered, as far as it has been possible to answer them.
The specific doubts have been raised and, as far as possible, laid to

rest~

We are novr approaching a point at which ,.,e must put the penultimate
question in solitary conscience .

It is this decision '1-rhich will produce the

final vote by '·rhich the Senate ,.,ill either give or '\·rithhold consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty.
The issue nov is not '1-rhether Germany mistrusts the Treaty or
France mistrusts it more or Communist China most of all .
The issue,

no~.v-,

and human genetics, or for

is not solely the meaning of the Treaty for health
~ilitary

strategy or for the technology and costs

of scientific arms-competition.
All these issues and others have been considered in the painstaking interrogation of the past few weeks .
ficance.

Each has its own unique signi-

But each is a fragment of the penultimate question and must be

so regarded if we are to reach sound decision.
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For the quertion which now confronts us is the one question which
is the sum of the many questions . And a rational response to it can only .
be

the sum of the many responses, weighed in the scale of such wisdom and

judgment as each of us may possess.

The attitude of no single expert or

group of experts in or out of government, no single official or group of
officials of this government, no single scientist or group of scientists
can be controlling on this question.

The question is for us alone to decide.

It is not for any_ sciP.ntist, military; leader, cabinet secretary or ,.,hatever
to decide for us.

It remains nm1 for elected Senators to decide for them-

selves, to confirm or refuse to confirm the judgment of an elected President.
This
Does the

penult~ate

Pl~posed

question which confronts us is simply stated:

Treaty serve, on balance, the interests of the people

of the United States, when those interests are considered in their totality1
Or to put it negatively:

Is the proposed Treaty, on balance,

in~cal

to

the interests of the people of the United .states?
If it is inimical, obviously, the President should not have had .
the Treaty signed in the first place and, certainly, the Senate should oot
now

con~ent

to its ratification.

But if the Troaty passes even a minimal

test, if reason tells us that, on balance, the Treaty is not inimical to
this nation, then that alone 'muld seem to be sufficient grounds for
approving it.

For if we mean what we say when we speak of supporting the

leadership of the President, irrespective of party, in his great national
responsibilities in foreign relations, we must mean, at least, that in
matters of this kind, we are inclined to give him thQ benefit of thOGe
vague and residual. hesitancies by which each o£ us in
possessed.

his own

way may be
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And may I aQd, Mr . President, that I do not see how any Senator
can vote either for or against this Treaty uith a sense of absolute assurance.
In any ma.jor essay in

forei~m

relations there are bound to be hesitancies .

They would be there if we debated the proposed Treaty or any ma.jor issue, a
month, a year or a decade.
There ,.,ere doubts and hesitancies "\-Then a Republican Congress voted
a Marshall Plan under a Democratic President.

There "'ere doubts and hesi -

tancies when a Democratic Congress voted a Middle East Resolution under a
Republican President .

The doubts are there year in and year out when Con-

gress considers the foreign aid program.

For the simple truth is that there

are no certainties, no absolutes in significant matters of foreign relations .
Indeed, were there no doubts on this question of a nuclear test
ban that in itself ,.,ould be cause for the deepest concern.

For the absence

of any doubt would suggest either a dangerous delusion or an insipid insignificance in the Treaty.
The truth is that there are risks in this as in any venture in
foreign relations.

But I remind the Senate that there are also risks in

failing to venture, in standing still in a world which does not stand still
for us or any nation.

And at this moment in the world's time, the risks of

a paralyzed uncertainty may be far greater than those which might stem from
the pursuit of this venture .
Indeed, there is a strong presumption that such must be the case .
I say that, Mr . Pr esident, because this proposed Treaty is no instant fancy,
no sudden concoction .
cision.

\ole

have not arrived in haste at this point of de-

The active pursuit of a Treaty to ban nuclear tests began many

years ago under the Administration of President Eisenhower .

The previous

admimstration was not passive and negative in its approach.

It sought a
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treaty in a most active and positive fashion .

Indeed, the former Vice

President journeyed to Hoscm·r in 1959 in an effort to further this objective, among others, of United States foreign policy.

And in a letter

dated April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower vrrote Mr . Khrushchev that:
"The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance
of nuclear weapons tests."

Note, Mr. President, the phrase "strongly seeks."

In short, t·1r . President, the search for a nuclear test ban treaty
was clearly a cardinal element in the foreign policy of the nation during

r.u-.

the second Eisenhower Administration.

\·Then

Kennedy assumed office, he

did not have to continue that search.

He could have abandoned it.

have ignored the efforts of the previous Administration.

He could

He could have

turned his back on the affirmations in favor of a nuclear test ban treaty,
as they were contained in the platforos of both parties during the 196o
Presidential campaign and upon which Mr . Kennedy and Mr . Hixon stood for
office.

That is a prerogative of the Presidency and Mr. Kennedy could have

exercised it had he judged, after a full examination of relevant information,
that the policy was detrimental to the interests of the nation.
But Mr . Kennedy did not so find .

On the contrary, he pursued

the matter even as Mr . Eisenhower had done before him.

And he continued

to pursue it, in spite of repeated set-backs and frustrations not unlike
those undergone by his predecessor, until an agreement vms, at last,
initialed by his distinguished agent, the Under Secretary of State, Mr.
Averell Harriman on July 25, 1963.

That agreement, I would note in order

to emphasize its non-partisan nature, is more closely in accord with the
concept of a nuclear test ban as it is contained in the Republican Party's
Presidential Platform in 196o than it is with the similar plank in the
Democratic Party's Platform.
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It is conceivable that one President of the United States may
have misjudged the American interest in this highly significant matter
although I do not for a moment suggest that such was the case with
President Eisenhower.

But I find it most difficult to believe that two

Presidents in succession would be guilty of neg1igence or poor judgment
on precisely the same question of national interest .

No, Mr. President,

there is a strong presumption that a test ban treaty is not only not
inimiial to the interests of the people of the nation but is to their
positive advantage.
Further, Mr. President, when members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Armed Services and the Senate members of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy probe every word, comma and period of the
text of the

Tre~ty,

when they examine every conceivable implication of the

Treaty for days on end, when they hear countless relevant witnesses of the
Executive Branch, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Director of the C. I.A . give sober but unmistakable support for this
Treaty, when the committees summon for testimony not only the advocates
of this Treaty but its most articulate competent opponents--in short,
11hen the treaty is subjected to the most stringent Senate Committee scrutiny
and the great preponderance of informed testimony is favorable, there is a
strong presumption that the Treaty is in the positive interests of the
United States .
And yet, t4r . President, a strong presumption is not enough in a
matter of this kind .

Each Senator has an individual responsibility to

examine this Treaty for himself in the light of his own conscience and
his o1vn concept of the interests of his state and the nation.
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The Senator from Montana has done so .

And having done so, he

is persuaded that the proposed Treaty does no violence to but, on the
contrary, serves the interests of the people of his state and the nation.
It serves those interests, immediately and tanaibly, in matters
of public health as they may involve a resident or a child yet to be
in Montana or in anyone of the fifty states.

~

I refer, Mr. President, to

the question of radiation which, as an uninvited but ever-present spectator, has haunted these

hearin~s

of the last few weeks.

To be sure, there

may be a lack of certainty among scientists and doctors on the precise
effects of can-made radiation on health end the human species .
there be no mistake about it.

But let

There is a minimal concept of the dangers

of radiation from which reputable scientific and medical opinion does not
depart .

It is expressed very clearly in the unanimous report of the

United Nations Scientific Comm:i.ttee on the Facta of Atomic Radiation,
17th Session of the General Assembly, 1962.

In this report, scientists

from 15 nations, including France, the United States, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada recorded their unanimous agreement
that:
"The exposure of mankind to radiation from increasing
numbers of artificial sources including the worldwide
contamination of the environment with short and longlived radio- nuclides from weapons tests calls for the
closest attention particularly because the effects of
any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully
manifested for several decades in the case of somatic
disease and for many generations in the case of genetic
damage . There should be no misunderstanding about the
reality of genetic damage from radiation . The Committee
therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided
entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed . "
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~~.

President, so far as I am aware, that statement has not been

challenged from a reputable medical or scientific source anywhere in the
world.

It is a most conservative statement and one must question the

sobriety of anyone who would pass off the factor of radiation damage as
irrelevant or propagandistic in the consideration of the proposed Treaty.
It is of central importance.

For what the statement says, in effect, is

that we do not knmr precisely hovr harmful man-made radioactivity is but
we are certain that it is not good for human health or for the genetics
of the human race .

It is not good, in short, for men, ,.,omen and children--

and particularly children--in Montana,. Arizona, Ohio,

Nevada,

~o/ashington,

Hississippi, Utah, or Missouri anymore than in London, Paris, Moscow,
Peking or Tokyo.

t·lhat the statement says, in effect, is that radiological

technicians in hospitals do not w·ear heavy protective clothing and dentists
do not shelter themselves for the fun of it vrhen they take X-rays .

They do

so because the stuff of X-rays, as of nuclear bomb tests, is insidiously
dangerous .

What the statement says, in effect, is that it is highly in-

advisable to put even minute quantities of strontium 90 or 89 into milk
or to add other radioactive isotopes such as Iodine 131 or Cesium-137 to
bread, as though they were vitamin A, B, C, or D.

They are quite the re-

verse in their effect on human health and on the human species .

The state-

ment says, in short, handle man-made radioactivity with extreme care or,
preferably, do not handle it at all .
Yet we have been compelling our own people to handle it as vrell
as the Russian people and others, and the Russians have been compelling
their people as well as ours and oih ers to handle it.

That has been the

consequence of bomb tests because, beyond the radiation released in proximity
to a test site.1 the phenomenon of'

f'al~out

results in a wide distribution
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throughout the world from each detonation wherever it may occur .

And

radioactivity is both ideologically neutral and wholly indifferent to
national boundaries .

When carried in the air- currents and clouds of the

atmosphere it places free peoples, Communist peoples or whatever, all on
this :planet, in the same radioactive boat .
\·Te will find some scientif'ic voices saying that it is not too

bad and very temporary, this thing which has already been done by nuclear
bomb tests to the planetary setting in which all human life is lived .

We

will find some scientific opinion which takes the opposite view, that the
genetic damage already done has been very substantial .

And we will find

many scientists who say so far it is not too bad but "'e had better avoid
much more .

That there are these differences is a reflection not so much

of a disagreement on the facts but of a paucity of facts and of differing
values which are put on the integrity of the individual human life .

Some

are more prepared than others, apparently, to sacrifice this integrity on
the altar of science for what is regarded as a valid scientific or defense
purpose .
In terms of statistics, our own Federal Radiation Council has
made some estimates of the human costs of the radioactive by-products of
nuclear bomb t ests .

The figures which it supplies are exclusive of the

effects of the last Russian test- series of super-bombs in 1962.

The

Council indicates that all tests in the United States and throughout the
world through 1961 could produce in this nation in this and future generations anywhere up to 15,000 cases of gross physical and mental birth defects and, possibly, up to a maximum of 2,000 leukemia cases and up to a
maximum of 700 cases of bone cancer l.rithin the next 70 years .

Other

- 9 adverse health effects of these tests, as, for example, those of radioactive
iodine 131 to children's thyroids in the vicinity of tests sites in the
mountain states of the West, are strongly suspect.
Cesium 137 which has been delivered in heavy

The same is true of

~uantities

to Eskimos in

Alaska as a result of Soviet tests in the Arctic.
Still other ill-effects cannot even be guessed at, as for example,
those of Carbon 14 which has a radioactive life of several thousand years
and may be said, therefore, to have already altered the human environment
permanently.
It is all very well to note that the

stati~tical

projections

suggest only a very small number of Americans as adversely affected by
all tests throughout the world through 1961.

But it would not be very

well to tell thet to the specific Americans who will suffer the consequences .

Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian test series of 1962

will add to the specific totals
United States .

~f

health damage already projected in the

It is clear, too, that any additional tests in the atmos-

phere by the Soviet Union, the United

Sta·~s

or any other eountry will do

the same and, in the absence of a treaty, the addition to the totals can
be large or small depending upon the whim and the capacity not only of
ourselves but of the Soviet Union or any other nation.
It is clear, in short, that hovrever small the effects appear to
be in the statistical computation, nuclear bomb-testing has already caused
a damage to human health and, potentially, its continuance is a great
danger to human health .

It is so clear that it can be said in this Senate

that ,.,e will not find one reputable scientific voice which will advocate
the continuance of bomb tests on the grounds that they are a kind of fillip
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for human health or a genetic stimulant for the improvement of the human
species.
Therefore, the fundamental, if unspoken, assumption of the Treaty
must be that neither this nation nor the Soviet Union seeks the dubious
distinction

~f

being the foremost contaminator of the earth's physical

environment with radioactive substances.

It is the assumption that the

Russians are at least rational enough and human enough to be concerned with
this menace to the health of their children and their grandchildren as we
are with respect to ours.
Those may be erroneous assumptions.

It may be, I suppose, that

the Russians are so obsessed with being first that it is all the same to
them whether the race has to do ,.,i th the Olympic Games, the moon, economic
growth, the ballet or radioactive contamination.

It may be that this

obsession is so strong that they are prepared to sacrifice even their
progeny to it.
Ev~ _ if

it were so, even if the Russians were indifferent to

the pollution of their own place, along with every other nation's place,
in the earth's environment, then all it would signify is that this Treaty
has little meaning.
good.

It would signify that the Treaty ,.,111 not do much

But, then, with the safeguards which are Erovided and assured,

neither will it do much harm.
For what would happen, Mr. President, if we ventured on the
assumption that the Russians did not wish to menace the health of their
own people anymore than we and events proved us wrong?

At some point in

the future, then, the Russians would resume atmospheric and marine testing.
But would they not be able to do that in any event in the absence of a
Treaty?

What is to stop t.bem?

And i.f they resume this dubious process
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of denaturizing the physical environment of mankind 1.rhat is to stop us from
joinins in this macabre competition once
dent.

again~

Not this Treaty, Mr. Presi-

There is nothing in this Treaty vrhich would stop us in those circum-

stances .

And it has been made very clear in the hearings that we intend to

rejoin this competition on very short notice if it is forced upon us .
ITo, t·1r . President, if there is any safe assumption in this Treaty,

it is that there is an absolute mutual interest-- that of the preservation
of human health--which applies to every nation on this globe .

This common

interest vrill either be pursued in good faith by all nations --especially
by the United States and the Soviet Union- - or all will suffer the consequences of the failure to do so .

There is no escape .

There is no way,

neither sneak nor open, to gain an advantage in this matter of health-not for us, not for the Soviet Union, not for any nation.

For the simple

fact is that if there are no atmospheric tests, the geiger counters vTill
taper their rhythms everY'·There .

If there are tests, the counters will

click their warning to human health in every part of the world.
To be sure, Mr . President, there are other nations--France and
China in particular--which, health factors notwithstanding, have already
announced that they will not adhere to this Treaty.

Such states will re -

main lesally free to test nuclear weapons in any other environment.
uithout this Treaty such HOuld still be the case .

But

Even at worst, these

countries cannot conceivably pose, for many years, anything remotely
resembling the kind of threat to human health which is implicit in a
resumption of unrestricted nuclear testing by the United States and the
Soviet Union.

With the Treaty effectively maintained betvreen the United

States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, we will have at least a
period of respite which, in itself, Hill be of some worldwide health benefit .
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And with the adherence of the great bulk of the civilized nations of the
world- - over 8o nations have already signed the agreement--there will be
an opportunity for a vigorous and concerted search for additional ways to
make the Treaty universal in its application.
r~ .

President, let me emphasize that there are no grounds for

sanguine expectations that this Treaty, even if it is ratified by this
nation will bring an end to the more dangerous types of nuclear testing.
It is a tangible hope; that is all .
is certain dispair..

But against that tangible hope there

In the absence of this Treaty, the process of radio-

active contamination of the environment by bomb tests 1-rill continue and in
all probability intensify.

Past experience indicates that deploring these

tests in speeches and party platforms will not end them.
Senate r esolutions against them will not prevent them.
in the U.N. General Assembly will not inhibit them.

Introducing
Passin~

resolutions

Voluntary moratoriums

will not stop them . All these expediencies, short of a treaty, have been
tried and they have not succeeded.

The inescapable fact remains that a

total anarchy in this critical matter still exists in the >·rorld.

The in-

escapable fact is that not only this nation but every nation is still completely free at this moment to wreak damage not only on its

o~m

of the earth's environment but on that of every other people.

heritage

And the

inescapable fact is that the fear of losing a technological military advantage or the hope of gaining one- -this terrifying fear and this elusive
hope--which in the past, have impelled the Russians no less than ourselves
to overlook the hazards to human health in these tests ''ill almost certainly compel us to do the same in the future .

We shall be so impelled,

and they shall be so impelled, unless this Treaty enters into force and
is scrupulously maintained on both sides.

The likelihood- -1 venture to
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say, the certainty--is that without this Treaty, the dangers to the health
of all Americans, of all human beings, from bomb-made radioactivity, will
multiply.

lleither an embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled evasion of

experience and fact changes the reality one iota.
Even if the Treaty

com~s

into force, it is obvious that this

Treaty, in itself, will not halt the continuing and intense scientific and
technological competition to gain a military advantage or to avoid losing
one.

That will go on for the present on both sides, as is very apparent

from the Senate hearings and from statements emanating from Moscow.

But

,;hat the Treaty does do is to put a muzzle on one aspect of thut competition.

Hhat the Treaty does do is to force the competition, insofar as it

is no"' dependent on nuclear testing on both sides, out of the atmosphere
and from the seas and on·;,;o the design boards and into the factories and
beneath the ground.
The Treaty mo.y not \Tork , Mr. President .

It mo.y be cheated or

frightened or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned into discard, quickly
or in time.

It may be, in the end, no more effective than the voluntary

moratoriums and the resolutions or whatever of the past.

And the world

will go on deploring these tests even as they multiply.
I hope no Senator will vote for ratification of this Treaty on
the mistaken belief that it is a guarantee that bomb tests will now cease
for all times.

The truth is that in voting for ratification of this Treaty,

as I have already stated, "''e will be voting for a hope.

rrr .

But let me stress,

President, that it is a significant, a tangible hope .
And so long as that hope, that tangible hope is present, the

Senator from !·1ontana is not going to tell the people of his state, that
he voted to dash it, to kill it.

He is not going to tell the people \rhom
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he represents that President Kennedy brought this hope, first raised under
President Eisenhower, to binding treaty form--this hope that there will no
longer be avoidable increases in the incidence of leukemia, bone cancer,
~d

cancer, birth malformations and other radiologically induced de-

ficiencies among Hontanans and Americans and all human beings- -but, for a
variety of reasons, he could not support the President.

The Senator from

Montana is not going to say that he could not support the President because
the French government or the Chinese Communist government did not like the
Treaty.

Nor will he say it because a prominent scientist out of a large

number of prominent scientists registered the very unscientific fiat of
his own oPinion that ·the Treaty vre.s a dreadful tragic mistake.

Nor vrill

he say it because he is convinced that in a wasteful spending competition
on armaments, our taxpayers can outspend the Russians, spend them into
bankruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves.
Nor will he say it because the statistical evidence showed
only a few Americans would die before their time or only a few American
children would be born malformed because of tests already conducted.

Nor

will he say it because the Treaty might also be signed by East Germany ann
he would much rather that the East Germans begin testing nuclear bombs than
that even the remotest suggestion be given that the United States had, by
getting into the same treaty, somehow recognized the existence of this
East German regime.
Nor will he say it because he believes that Russians, who most
certainly cannot be trusted in many things cannot be trusted even to cease
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denaturizing their

o~m environ~ent

along with ours and everyone else's on

earth.
No, Mr . President, the Senator from Montana is not going to tell
l·iontaoans that he opposed this Treaty on any of these grounds .

Yet all

have been advanced at one time or another in the past weeks as grounds for
rejecting this Treaty.
There is one ground--one ground alone --on which the Senator from
Montana would be prepared to go home and tell the people vrho sent him to
Hashington, that these tests in the atmosphere and in the seas must go on
despite t!1e great potentlal threat of' their continuance to their health
and to their children's health.
He would not make light of these health risks or pass over them
but he would ask his constituents to accept them in all their grim portent
because he vra.s persuaded that this Treaty would expose the natj.on, to a
greater extent than w·e now are, to a military attack which Hould destroy
both the meaning and much of the substance of' the life which we have built .
He vrould not ask them to accept the hPalth risks of' indiscriminate
and uncontrolled nuclear testing if all he had vras a personal surmise that
the risks of military attack would increase, if all he had were vague personal doubts and hesitancies in the face of a new course .

To ask them to

accept the health risks he would have to find in the total record1 specifics for concluding that the risks of military attack would be significantly
increased by our adherence to this Treaty.

He would have to find, in speci-

fics , affirmative answers to these questions:
1.

Is there some nation, other than the Soviet Union--Communist

China, for example--wtich, by not adhering to this Treaty, is likely to
develop a nuclear technology which will approximate ours in the next decade,

- 16 another nation •ihich could close the nuclear gap solely because it tested
and we did not?
2.

The

ans~er

is no.

If the Soviet Union, then, is the one nation which poses a

nuclear threat to the United States in the next decade or more, has that
nation already achieved a substantial advantage, on balance, over the
United States in the military technology derived from nuclear physics--the
kind of advantage which we might neutralize by a continuance of aboveground tests on our side even though they also continued to improve their
te~hniques

through such testing on their side?

The answer, insofar as it

is possible to answer the question, on the basis of fact, knowledge and
the over,rhelming judgment of the most highly skilled and qualified witnesses
in the nation is no.

3· Is there any reason to assume that our advances in nuclear
science and its application to military technology will be hampered to a
greater degree than that of the Soviet Union, in the complete absence of
atmospheric and marine tests on both sides?

The answer is no.

4. By the terms of this Treaty, will the Soviet Union be legally
authorized to do anything which we are not also authorized to do?

The

answer is no .

5· By the terms of this Treaty are we legally forbidden to do
anything which the Soviet Union is not legally forbidden to do?

The

answer is no .

6. Is there any other than the most remote possibility that the
Soviet Union could engage in prohibited but significant tests without de tection?

The answer is no .

- 17 7.

If the Soviet Union were to engage in a clandestine test

and if it were identified or if we had very valid reason to believe that
such a test had occurred even if not identified, would we ourselves still
be bound to forego a resumption in testing above ground?

The answer is no.

8. Is there a significant possibility that a single Soviet test
suddenly sprung upon us could so alter the balance of military forces
between the two nations as to increase the risk of military attack upon us.
The answer is no.
In short, the answer to every

~p e cific

possibility of the Soviet Union or any n3tion
nificant military advantage as against
yes but no.

doubt which involves the

g~ining

o~rselves

same unique or sig-

in this Treaty is not

And because it is no, I cannot in good conscience ask any

citizen of Montana to accept the heightened risks to the health of their
families which will be inevitable in the absence of the ratification of
this Treaty by the United States.
If there are not specific grounds of unigue disadvantage to the
military defense of the nation for rejecting this Treaty, what other
grounds can there be?

One detects in the few articulate opponents of this

Treaty, a consistent theme which suggests a basis for the remaining doubts
and hesitancies.

It is, apparently, the belief that our

scientific-milita~

complex is so superior to all others that if not subjected to any limitation
as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in military- nuclear
technology .

The ccmplex, it is suggested, will achieve some incredible

breakthrough so as to widen, once and for all, the gap as between ourselves
and the Soviet Union .
a testing_limitation,

That the Soviet Union, of course, in the absence of
wi~also

be free to seek a similar breakthrough
i

- 18 is either overlookec'i. or regarded of little consegue:'lce.

That there are

dangers to health in the continuing process of uncontrolled testing by
both sides, of

c~urse,

is either overlooked or regarded as of little

consequence .
~~.

President, I have the highest respect for our

n~clear

physics, our industrial technology, our military leadership and our
capacity to merge them into a powerful complex for the purpose of the
nation's defense.

This complex is second to none in the world.

But

admiration and respect for these capacities do not and must never compel
the elected offic]als of this Dr•.ticn to accept the dictum of this complex
as to what is best for the people of the United States.
The ffl.ct is that this Treaty '¥'ill introduce no curbs upon the
crea.ti vi ty and d;y-.aa.!llism of the complex which are not also placed equall.y
upon such complexes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world.
men of scientific genius or highly developed

technolo~ical

That

specialization

may find such curbs irkscme or burdensome is understandable.

Fut there

is too much at stake here, for the nation and for the world, for the
Senate to be persuaued by individual considerations of that kind.
Indeed, reason and experience must lead us to question most
seriously the course of policy which flows from such considerations.

It

is the course which assumes that if we will only continue to debar any
restraints on testing, if we will only continue to throw considerations
of public health to the winds, our scientists and our technicians will
create that decisive nuclear
insure the nation's security.

~a]J

that ultimate military gap, which will

- 19 Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since
the first at01aic bombs in the New Mexico flats and over Hiroshima and
Nagasaki?

What restraints, indeed, what reins have been placed on the

full exploration of this immense power of nuclear
years?

Uot those of money, to be sure .

to be s<l!'e .

~ne

in all these

Not those of a ban on testing,

Through all these years since \olorld vlar II there has been

no treaty to bar nuclear tests of any kind .
again.

destructio~

We have tested again and

Russians have done the same.

And what has happened, Mr. President?

We began in 1945 with

the atomic bomb, with what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate
gap.

By

1949, four years later, the

their first atomic test .

~-~siens

began to close that gap with

In 1952, we opened what vre believed was the

decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the first explosion of the immensely
more powerful hydrogen bomb.

And by 1953, nine months later, that gap

too began to close in a Soviet test of a similar type of weapon .
So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, what has
all these years of unrestricted testing?

h~pened

in

Has the gap widened with the

free rein which has been allowed to the scientific-industrial-military
complex?

Have we gained the absolute advantage, the ul tima.te advantage

which will guarantee the nation ' s security?
has not widened.
ing point .

The truth is that the gap

On the contrary, it has narrowed almost to the vanish -

It has narrowed both in terms of the basic knowledge of the

sciences involved and in terms of the application of that knowl edge in
military technology .
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Once no nation, except ourselves, could have inflicted on any
other, tens of millions of nuclear deaths in a matter of hours.

Now, we

ourselves, no less than others, are subject to a catastrophe of this
magnitude.
In short , the nation has not been made more secure in any real
sense by this indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of security by nuclear
development through almost two decades for the simple reason that others
were also engaged in the same indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit .

This

furious and frantic race for superiority in the capacity to inflict nuclear
devastation in mass

o~

security in the end

ha~rovided

on~y

in caliperic refinement in the interests of national
security to no

~ation.

It has provided

the assurance that the prospect of irrmediate and massive destruction

to others will be at least as great as that prospect is to ourselves .
That is vitally important insurance in the kind of world in which we live
but let us not delude ourselves as to the nature of the coverage.

We have

provided not security for the nation but only insurance that if our civili zation

is~t

to the nuclear torch by any hand, others will be consumed in

the same stuoendous blaze.
To cling to the belief that the continuance of indiscriminate
testing is the margin which provides forfue security of this nation is to
fly in the face of the reality of experience.

It is not a scientific view.

It is not even an understandable pride and faith in our own great scientific,
technological and military capacities.

It is a

~stic

and egocentric belief

which borders --and I choose the words carefully--on a most dangerous and
tragic obsession .
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obsession.

President, this Treaty, in itself, is no answer to that

This Treaty is but a slender strand of hope drawn painfully

from the web of conflicting interests, hideous fears and fatuous and
immature arrogances out of which are spun the relations of nations in
our times.

It is an evidence, slight and uncertain, but an evidence that

there exists that capacity of courage and that '1-Till to life, which may
yet bring to bear on this stifling entanglement, the quiet and simple
power of human reason .
Do not, Mr . President , look for miracles from this Treaty .
There are none.

Thjs nation, the Soviet Union and the world are destined

to live for a lonR time with feet
the human
void of

civili~ation

darY~ess,

dan~?;ling

over

tl~~

which is our common heritage.

this Treaty is a feeble candle.

grave that beckons to
A~ainst

that immense

It is a flicker of

light where there has been no light.
The Senator from Montana Hill vote for this light and he '1-Till
hope for its strengthening by subseguent acts of reason on all sides.
He

'~>!ill

vote for ratification of this

Trea~

beca.use it is, on clear

balance, in the interests of the people of his state and the United States .
He "rill vote for it because it is a testament to the universal vitality
of reason.
life itself .

He will vote for it because it is an affirmation of human

